The Perception of Undemocracy in Bangladesh's Upcoming 2026 Election-under Yunus' illegal regime and Pathways to Rectification

The dramatic ouster of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August 2024, amid student-led protests against her elected govt, has positioned Bangladesh at a crossroads. The interim illegal government under Muhammad Yunus has announced scheduled national elections for February 2026, allegedly aiming to restore democracy after implementing reforms, timed before Ramadan. Yet, persistent concerns label the process as potentially undemocratic, rooted in institutional biases, exclusions, and societal fractures. Below, I examine these factors and propose corrective actions, highlighting the imperative for independent election oversight to safeguard integrity.

Why the Upcoming Election Risks Being Undemocratic?

1. Exclusion of a Major Political Party: The May 2025 illegal ban on the Bangladesh Awami League (AL) under anti-terrorism laws has disenfranchised a party with 30-40% historical support. This exclusion risks alienating supporters and skewing results.

2. Prolonged Interim Rule and Reform Delays: Postponements from late 2025 to 2026 for democratic reforms have bred skepticism, exacerbated by economic woes and internal rifts between Yunus and the army chief. Such delays mirror past caretaker regimes that eroded stability.

3. Risk of Extremism and Polarization: Delays have amplified extremism and violence, with polarized discourse accusing entities of undemocracy. Without inclusivity, the election may not represent the populace.

4. Lack of Judicial Independence: The judiciary faces mob influence and coercive pressures, compromising its autonomy despite reform commissions. Under Yunus, judicial integrity is undermined, with mobs dictating verdicts and ongoing challenges to independence. This erodes fair adjudication of electoral disputes.

5. Biased Police and Security Agencies with Criminal Records: Police and security forces, implicated in extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and torture under Yunus, continue to exhibit biases, including religious favoritism toward majority groups. Under Yunus regime, crime surges and mob violence highlight institutional weaknesses, with reports of framing innocents and failing to protect minorities, potentially influencing voter intimidation.

6. Non-Independent Election Commission: Despite agreements to establish a new commission, doubts persist about its autonomy, given historical manipulations and ongoing confusion over timelines. Reforms aim for credibility, but interim control raises fears of bias.

7. Issues Facing Minorities: Post-Hasina, minorities—particularly Hindus, Ahmadis, and ethnic groups—have endured over 200 attacks, including murders and property destruction, amid perceptions of AL affiliation. This violence, often unchecked, threatens minority voter participation and fair representation.

8. Involvement of Foreign Players and Religious Leaders: Geopolitical influences complicate the process, with China & Pakistan engaging politically ahead of polls, and US visa policies signaling oversight. Meanwhile, religious leaders and Islamist parties are filling power vacuums, potentially swaying politics toward extremism and undermining secular democracy. This external and internal meddling risks polarizing the electorate.

These elements collectively foster an environment where the election could perpetuate undemocratic cycles rather than resolve them.

What Is Needed to Correct This and Ensure a Democratic Election

To foster a truly democratic process, the interim government must address these flaws through targeted reforms and safeguards:

1. Lift or Condition the Awami League Ban: Reinstate the AL under Hasina's leadership, to ensure inclusivity.

2. Election Oversight by Independent Observers: Invite monitors from the neighbourhood like India & Asean early to oversee all stages, deterring fraud and building trust.

3. Accelerate and Transparent Reforms: Expedite independent Election Commission setup and voter updates with public timelines, alongside economic relief.

4. Foster Inclusive Political Dialogue: Convene forums with parties, civil society, and military for reconciliation, including amnesties and minority protections to curb extremism.

5. Strengthen Institutional Safeguards: Enact constitutional changes for judicial and media independence, police accountability (e.g., probes into past crimes and bias training), and EC autonomy to prevent future abuses.

6. Protect Minorities and Mitigate External Influences: Enhance security for minorities through dedicated task forces and impartial policing, while engaging foreign actors constructively to avoid interference, perhaps via UN-mediated dialogues.

7. Regulate Religious Influence: Implement measures to limit undue sway by extremist religious leaders in politics, promoting secular campaigns to maintain democratic pluralism.

Conclusion

Bangladesh's 2026 election without proper democratic setup and processes could place Bangladesh under an illegal govt while undermining regional stability. By tackling judicial biases, security flaws, EC independence, minority vulnerabilities, and external/religious meddling—bolstered by independent oversight—the government can ensure a fair outcome. Absent these, the process risks echoing past failures, hindering true democratic renewal.